Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1964

Verneta Cornia v. Albertson's : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Bayle, Hurd & Lauchnor; Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent;
Woodrow D. White; Attorneys for Appellant;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Cornia v. Albertson's, No. 10062 (Utah Supreme Court, 1964).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/4495

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

Ut~JVERS1TY

o::

UTAr

==============~:;::;::==· )4

IN THE SUPREME COU·R!T

~v

OF THE STATE OF UTAH

t J

----41-C- ~
{'' ~ l

~P'"'

, l96A

VERNETA CORNIA,
PlOiintiff-.Appellant, _
C~.;r'... Su
-vs.-

_.....

--~

10--c;~~;, ll i..&h

Case
No.10062

ALBERTSON'S, a Corporation
Defendarnt-Respondeut.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
Appeal From the Judgment of the
Third District Court for Salt Lake County
HoN. A. H. ELLETT, J_ ud ge

WOODROW D. WHITE
2121 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84115

Attorney fo~fl~it;-,
IL\.YLE, HURD & LAUCHNOR,
1105 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

o:-

APR 2 ~

Attorneys for Dcfcndaut-RespondeJif

~ LA.~,x..;~~~v\:

!
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX
Page

STATEMENT OF FACTS ............... ......... .. .......................................

2

ARGUMENT ....... ·····································---·-··-----·····································

14

POINT 1:
DURING THE COURSE OF THE JURY'S DELIBERATIONS THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE
PREJUDICE OF THE PLAINTIFF, IN REQUIRING
THE JURORS TO SHOW HIM THE SPECIAL VERDICT FORM BEFORE THEIR DELIBERATIONS
WERE COMPLETED; IN REQUIRING THEM TO DELIBERATE IN OPEN COURT IN HIS PRESENCE
AND IN THE PRESENCE OF THE PARTIES; IN DIRECTING THEM TO SIGNIFY BY RAISED HANDS
HOW THEY WERE VOTING; IN DIRECTING THEM
TO SIGN THEIR NAMES TO THE QUESTIONS ON
THE SPECIAL VERDICT IN OPEN COURT; AND IN
REQUIRING THEM TO MAKE, THROUGH HIM,
PREMATURE DISCLOSURE OF THEIR PARTIALLY
COMPLETED VERDICT ..............................................................

14

POINT 2.
THE COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE
PLAINTIFF IN DIRECTING THE COURT REPORTER TO READ PART OF THE DIRECT TESTIMONY
OF THE WITNESS COBURN ....................................................

20

POINT 3.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR MISTRIAL AND IN DENYING PLAINTIFF SUBSEQUENT MOTION FOR A
NEW TRIAL ....................................................................................

24

CONCLUSION .......................................................................................... 25

Cases Cited
Brasfield v. United States, 71 L. Ed. 345.............................................. 15
Jenkins v. Stephens, 64 U. 307, 231 Pac. 112......................................

21

Kelsey v. United States, 47 F. 2d 453....................................................

16

State of Utah v. :\lartinez, 7 U. 2d, 387, 326, Pac. 2d 102....................

19

State v. Petrson, 110 U. 413, 174 Pac. 2d 843......................................

22

Statutes Cited
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 47 (L)........................................

15

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
rERNET.\ CORNIA,
P!a.i1d iff-Appellant,
Case
No.10062

-\"S.-

.\LBEHTSON'S, a Corporation
Dr feud ant-Res pond rn t.

APP·ELLAN.T'S BRIEF
STATEl\fENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action for personal injuries arising out
of a fall due to a slippery substance on the floor of one
of the Albertson's supermarkets in Salt Lake City, in
which the plaintiff suffered injury to her back, requiring
two operations.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This ea~e was tried to a jury. The court submitted
a sperial verdirt to the jury in the form of five questions
and upon the basis of answers given to the special verdirt. the court ordered the clerk to enter judgment, no
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cause of action, which was accordingly done. Plaintiff
made motion for new trial which was thereafter denied,
from which plaintiff appeals.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-appellant seeks reversal of the judgment in
the court below and a new trial.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This appeal is based exclusively upon the conduct
of the court after the case had been submitted to the jury;
however, it will be helpful to this court for a summary to
be made of the evidence pertaining to the negligence
of the defendant, particularly with respect to the error
of the court in unduly emphasizing a portion of the direct testimony of one of the defendant's witnesses.
Throughout this brief the appellant will be referred to
as the plaintiff and the respondent will be referred to as
the defendant.
Plaintiff, accompanied by her brother, Lon W. Rigby,
went to the Albertson store on North Temple July 8,
1962, at about 6:30 p.m., to buy groceries. (R. 94) As
she was entering the aisle of the produce department she
slipped on a slippery substance and fell. (R. 97)
''It was some sort of produce. It was a slicky or
slick, slimy sort of a substance ... I took it to be
either part of a tomato or some grapes or something of that type produce.''
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This substance was intermingled with grime and. dirt.
(R. 99) The witness, Verneta Cornia, further described
the substance as
'' ... a slick, slimy substance with an accumulation of dirt over it." (. 178)
The witness Lon W. Rigby testified that he had paid
particular attention to the condition of the floor of the
~ton•, and had particularly noticed that it was rather
dirty, PVell at the front near the checking stands. (R. 187)
He described the substance the plaintiff slipped on as
follows:
'''Veil, I would describe it as very dirty, slimy
substance that occurred from falling objects and
falling produce and that had been on it some
time and that - and it was mingled in with a lot
of dirt and grime and things from the slimy produce and things that was there, and I noticed
that generally around the whole thing, and then
there was also an area which appeared- I could
s<'e below where they had also been mopping and
some of - appeared to me that actually some of
the water hadn't reached that area, but as one
had stepped on it, it could have been some of the
water left tracked up to that area mingled in with
that debris and things that had been on the floor."
(R. 189)
The problem on the floor did not appear to be just
due to a single item of a cherry or a piece of tomato. (R.
189) He could not identify the type of vegetable or fruit
involved because of the dirt which was mingled in with
the substance and other things around that particular
area. The slimy, slippery dirty condition of the store was
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not confiined to the point where plaintiff fell. The witness definitely observed that throughout the store the
floor was about as dirty as any chain store he had ever
been in up to that time. (R. 190) The witness testified
that a person working at the checking stand could have
seen the floor area where plaintiff fell, as she fell right
close to one of the checking stands. (R. 196)

Ronald P. Sartori, a former employee of the defendant, testified that the floor had been swept about 20 minutes to half an hour before plaintiff fell. (This certainly
gave store employees an opportunity to observe the
condition of the floor at that time and indicates a negligent sweeping.) (R. 211) It was the policy of the store
to clean up any accumulations of dirt or filth to keep
the store clean at all times. (R. 213)
As a stock clerk, the witness Sartori would be in the
aisle several times during the course of the day and
would be in a position to observe whether the aisles were
clean or dirty. (R. 216) There are certain items of grime
and dirt that get onto supermaarket floors that do not
come up with a broom and quite a bit of spot mopping
has to be done, especially at the close of the day. (R.
217) There were areas around the produce department
that needed to be spot mopped. (R. 218)
The witness Andreason was the store employee who
designated Mr. Coburn to do the sweeping and mopping.
Regardless of the numerous trips he made through the
store on inspection, he did not request any spot mopping
or brooming prior to the time they were a bout ready
4
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t u close t lu~ store. When the need existed, spot mopping

not left to the end of the business day. (R. 233) The
wit npss acknowledged that sometimes objects get stepped
on before they are picked up and they get intermingled
with the g-rime that might be on the floor and the dust
whi('h makes a rather slippery dangerous floor. He
('Ould not say that any spot mopping was done in the
Yieinity of thr vegetable counter or the fruit display
until ahout closing time. (R. 234) There were several
areas in the store that needed spot mopping when he
told l\f r. Co burn to do it, but he doesn't know at what
time of day they first needed to be spot mopped. (R. 235)
wns

The witness, Timothy D. Coburn, testified that he
was employed by Albertson's in July of 1962. (R. 220)
That he was down at the end of the produce aisle mopping at the time Mrs. Cornia fell. He had previously
Hwept the whole floor. He stated:
'''"ell, the produce aisle has to be thoroughly
swept because there is a ledge underneath the produce aisle where the lettuce and that are kept,
where they can be wet down, and you have to particularly get under there because something can
roll under there that you can't see, and you have
to make sure it is clean because the produce are
slippery.'' (R. 221)
Coburn was asked by the witness Ronald Sartori to
mop up a mess and he observed what looked like a cherry.
There was a pit and a maroon skid mark. The skid mark
was about nine to twelve inches. Coburn cleaned up
the mess and went back to work. There was no water on
the floor at that point. He did not notice any produce
5
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or other items on the floor in this area. Coburn's assignment was to make sure that the floor was clean and spot
mop it where it needed to be mopped. He had swept the
aisle where Mrs. Cornia fell about twenty to thirty
minutes prior to the time she fell. (R. 222)
After the matter had been submitted to the jury and
they had retired for their deliberations, they were called
into court. At the request of the juror Pearce the court
ordered the reporter to read the direct testimony of the
witness Coburn down to the point where he mentioned
sweeping the aisle where Mrs. Cornia fell about twenty
to thirty minutes prior to the time she fell. (R. 254 R. 258)
The cross examination of the witness Coburn was
not later read to the jury, but upon cross examination
witness Coburn qualified his direct testimony by stating
that there were areas around the produce counter in the
vicinity of where Mrs. Cornia fell that needed to be spot
mopped. After he had swept the floor down some twenty
to thirty minutes earlier he intended to return with the
mop and clean those areas up. There had been things
on the floor that the cart had made marks in, intermingled dirt and moisture and possibly from other produce
that had fallen and been picked up or things of that
nature. That all grocery stores in spots will be grimy,
particularly around the produce department. (R. 224}
The store is always dirtier towards the close of the day
and this was a pretty busy store. (R. 225) He had been
spot mopping for about fifteen minutes when the incident
happened. He was almost through. (R. 226)
6
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Some of the water gets intermingled with the dirt
and the grime there and helps to create a problem requiring spot mopping. The residue of whatever lettuce
leaves or tomato or fruit or cherry or whatever it is
that might have fallen on the floor becomes mingled with
watPr and dirt and has to be spot mopped, but the witness
rlnimed there was no water on the floor at that time.
The produce manager freshened the vegetables on that
day prior to 4:00 o'clock. (R. 227)
Hon:ard L. Andreason testified that he was the third
man or third manager of the store. (R. 229) He designated Mr. Coburn to sweep and mop the floor on the
day of the accident. He did not recall requesting any
sweeping or mopping prior to 6:00 o'clock on that day.
Despite the numerous trips which he claimed to have
made through the store on inspection, he required no
spot mopping or brooming prior to the time they were
ready to close. (R. 233) Customers going by a display
of cherries or grapes knock them off the table onto the
floor, sometimes these objects get stepped on before
they are picked up and they get intermingled with the
grime that might be on the floor and it makes rather
a slippery, dangerous floor. Does not recall whether
any spot mopping was done in the vicinity of the vegetable counter or fruit display until just about closing
time. (R. 23) There were several areas in the store that
needed spot mopping when Mr. Coburn was told to do it,
but the witness did not know what time of day they first
needed to be spot mopped. At any rate, the spot mopping
was not assigned until about 6:00 o'clock so that there
7
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may have been areas in the store at 2:00 o'clock in the
afternoon that should have been spot mopped. (R. 235)
At the conclusion of the evidence, the defendant made
a motion for dismissal, claiming failure on the part of
the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case and the court
ruled that it was a jury question and denied the motion.
(R. 240)
The jury were recessed from the court room at 4 :21
p.m. to retire to the jury room and at 6 :31 p.m. the court
called them back to inquire as to the status of their deliberations and appetite. He asked the jurors if they
had answered some of the questions and was informed
by the foreman that they had. The court requested that
the sheriff pass the incompleted special verdict up to
him for examination, and was told by the foreman that
the verdict had not been signed, whereupon the court
said:
''THE CouRT: You don't have to sign. If you
have got an answer - you won't need to mark it.
Let me take a little view of how we are going.
''MR. 0AKSON: We have done more than we
show here, Your Honor.
''THE CouRT: Well, maybe if you would show
what you (R. 249) have now done and let me see,
it might be that we could save some time in this.
"MR.

0AKSON:

Can I tell you what-

'' THE CouRT : No, don't tell me yet. I don't
want these fellows to know. I am leaguing up with
you, but if you can do it in that - can do it in the
jury boxf
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"\I R. O.u<sox: Sure. 'Ve are down to one ques-

tion.
"THE ( 1oFitT: Okeh. You do what you can,
and t ht•n ld me take a look at it. Now, for the two
nnHwers that an' here, would more than six jurors
sign that?
"~In.

0.\ Ksox: Six, yes, sir, or more.

"THE CouRT: Well, let's have six sign that,
and then I believe I will have some help for you .
..\11(1 if six or more have signed each one, would
yon sign at the end thereof as foreman too, Mr.
Oakson.
"~~ n. 0AKSON:

All right, sir. On each individ-

ual question?
''THE CouRT: The answers are as follows, and
I will let counsel know and ask you to show by

the raising of your hand if you have agreed with
this answer: 'Did the plaintiff receive any injury
as a result of any slip or fall which she (R. 250)
sustained in the defendant's store~' The answer
is 'Yes.'
•' Those jurors who agreed and signed that
answer please raise your hands. That is six hands
np. The ones disagreeing with that would be Mr.
Jordan and :Mr. Lewis, yes.
''Question 2, 'Did any employee of the defendant place any slick or slimy substance upon the
floor which caused the plaintiff to slip or fall~'
The answer is 'No.'
"That is signed by all eight jurors. If you
agree with this answer, show your hand. That's
all hands.
"Question - there are only five that signed
question 3. Is there somebody else that signed9
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five can't find that. Is there somebody who didn't
sign No. 3?
''MR. U NDERwoon: That is the one we are held
up on.
''MR. LEWIS: That is the one we are held up
on.
"THE CouRT: I see. So we have no answer
to 3.
"MR. 0AKSON: That's right.
"THE CouRT : Oh. Well, I can't help you. If
the answer - if 3 had been answered, I could
have saved a little time. So there really isn't an
answer to 3 yet. So my - I was going by the answer, assuming that six had agreed. I was in error
about that, and I would have to let you debate
further on 3.'' (R. 251)
After informing the jury that he would send them
out to dinner the court stated that if they had answered
the first 4 questions there could be a possibility that
it would not matter whether they answered 5 or not,
depending on how the first 4 were answered, so he would
keep the partial verdict locked up until they returned
from lunch. (R. 252)
The juror Pearce told the court that he was deeply
concerned a bout whether they were spot mopping the
floor or whether it was a general mop. (R. 253)
The juror Pearce asked that the testimony of the
witness Coburn be read, whereupon the court directed
the reporter to read the testimony of the witness Coburn.
(R. 254)
The reporter then proceeded to read from the direct testimony only of the witness Coburn pertaining to
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the swePping and mopping of the store and to the disrovcry of the substance which looked like a cherry in
the area where the plaintiff slipped. The witness also
tt·stificd to having swept the floor and having made sure
that it was clean and that the floor was dry and that he
had swPpt the aisle about twenty to thirty minutes prior
to the plaintiff's fall. (R. 255 to R. 258)
Mr. Pearce stated that he had heard enough and

none of the jurors indicated an interest upon hearing any
more upon being questioned by the court. None of the
cross-examination was read, which qualified considerably
the tP~timony on direct. Another juror, Mr. Cornelius,
said to the court that it seemed to him that the crux of
the matter in question 3 was time, to which the court
agreed, but the juror stated that in his opinion time
wasn't the crux of it and he wanted to know if he could
properly abstain from voting on this. The court then entered into a rather lengthy explanation of the duty of
the store and as to what would constitute negligence on
the defendant's part. (R. 258, R. 259)
Thereafter the juror Oakson reacted to the coercive
comments of the court, suggesting that they ought to go
to eat and come back to give everybody a chance, to which
the court acquiesced. (R. 260) The coercive effect of the
court's participation in the juror' deliberations in the
courtroom was also felt by the juror Lewis who asked
permission to make the following statement:
"MR. LEWIS: I think that on something like
this, I don't think for all the parties involved there
should be any trying to rush this idea of getting
11
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home. Goodness only kno"Ts I ha Yc to go to the
office, and I will be working tonight, and I am sure
the rest of them will, but if we go in there for ten
minutes, I know it is going to be in my opinion,
just going to be a matter of trying to get a decision, and I think in fairness to both parties that
it should be decided on a. level of not rushing
and taking the time.
''MR. PEARCE: Right.
''MR. JORDAN : Right.
"THE CouRT: You get that anyway. If you
bring your verdict in, the sheriff will take you.
''MR. LEwis : The thing I am getting at is if we
try to go in on ten minutes, I don't think it is a
fair verdict.'' (R. 261)
After the jury had been released to go to dinner
and while they were continuing their deliberations, counsel for the plaintiff made the following statement into
the record:
"MR. WHITE: Comes now the plaintiff and excepts to the proceedings interrupting the deliberations of the jury wherein the jury were called back
into the courtroom, and during the course of inquiry as to whether they wanted to continue their
deliberations or go to lunch, the court inquired
as to the stage of the deliberations, and in the
course of such inquiry suggested that the special
verdict which had been handed to them for find:
ing be shown to him with the view that he might
assist in their deliberations, and that the verdict
was in fact shown to him before it was arrived at,
and discussion had been upon it and returned to
the jury, and the jury deliberated on it in the
courtroom and again returned to the court, and
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the court made ('(•mment on it, read part of the
n•rd i(·t without reading all of it; and plaintiff ex<'Ppts to this entire proceeding as being against
In w and irregular and interfering with the functions of the jury to independently arrive at a ver(lict; that it prejudiced the negotiations for settlemPnt pending the deliberations of the jury; that it
made an untimely revelation of the course of the
deliberations which the jury's verdict was taking.
"Further objects to the reading of the testimony- the direct testimony of one witness at the
request of one of the jurors to the jury. Excepts
to the failure to read the cross examination on the
ground that the portion read placed undue emphasis upon that part of the witness's testimony,
and although it satisfied the juror that had made
the inquiry concerning the matter, it may very
well have operated to the prejudice of the plaintiff with respect to the other jurors who had not
yet completed their deliberations; placed undue
emphasis upon the direct examination of one witness only on a vital portion of the evidence about
which there was other evidence elicited from other
witnesses; and that the direct testimony was also
modified by the cross examination, which was
not read to the jury." (R. 262, R. 263)
The plaintiff thereafter moved for a mistrial which
the court denied. (R. 265)
Thereafter the jury returned to the courtroom and
g-an~ the court their special verdict in which 6 jurors
agreed that the plaintiff had been injured by her fall in
the defendant's store. All 8 jurors found that no employee of the store had placed any slick or slimy sub~tance on the floor, and answering question 3, 6 of the 8
jurors found that the slick or slimy substance had not

13
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been upon the floor for such a length of time as \Yould
have permitted employees of the defendant to have notirt)
of it and remove it. Seven of the jurors agreed that the
plaintiff was not contributorily negligent. (R. 266)
The court thereupon indicated judgment in favor
of the defendant, no cause of action. (R. 267)

ARGUMENT
POINT 1.
During the course of the jury's deliberations
the trial cottrt erred to the prejudice of the
plaintiff, in requiring the jurors to show him
the special tterdict form before their deliberations were completed; in requiring them to deliberate in open cou.rt in his presence and in the
presence of the parties; in directing them to
signify by raised hands how they 1uere voting;
in directing them to sign their n.rvmrs to the
questions on the special verdict in open court;
a;nd in requiring them to make, through him,
premature disclosure of their partially completed verdict.
The extent of the trial court's interference with
the deliberations of the jury in this case seems to be without appellate court approved precedence in the history of
trial by jury. We certainly respect the right of the trial
rourt to recall the jury for the purpose of inquiring whether they were near a verdict or would like to go to dinner,
hut we feel that the trial court should restrain his curiosity and not probe into the details of the jury's deliberations to the point of requiring them to display to him
14
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a partially comp]('tetl special verdict form which led
to his subsequent regrettable interference with the jury's
fa('t-finding function. Rule 47 (L) provides that the officer in charge of the jury must not suffer any communication to be made to them, or make any himself, except to
ask them if they have agreed upon their verdict, and he
must not, before the verdict is rendered, communicate
to any person the state of their deliberations or the verdict agreed upon.
In Brasfield v. United States, 71 L. Ed. 345, appears
the following :
''The only errors assigned which are pressed
upon us concern proceedings had upon recall of
the jury after its retirement. The jury having
failed to agree after some hours of deliberation,
the trial judge inquired how it was divided numerically and was informed by the foreman that
it stood nine to three, without indicating which
number favored a conviction.
"We deem it essential to fair and impartial
conduct of the trial that the inquiry itself should
be regarded as ground for reversal. Such procedure serves no useful purpose that cannot be attained by questions not requiring the jury to reveal the nature or extent of its division. Its effect
upon a divided jury will often depend on circumstances which cannot properly be known to the
trial judge or to the appellate courts and may
vary widely in different situations, but in general
its tendency is coercive. It can rarely be resorted
to without bringing to bear in some degree, serious although not measurable, an improper influence on the jury, from whose deliberations
eYery consideration other than that of the evi-

15
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dence and the law as expressed in a proper charge,
should be excluded. Such a practice, which is never
useful and is generally harmful, is not to be
sanctioned.
"The failure of appellant's counsel to particularize an exception to the court's inquiry does not
preclude this court from correcting the error ...
This is especially the case where the error, as
here, affects the proper relations of the court to
the jury, and cannot be sufficiently remedied by
modification of the judge's charge after the harm
has been done. It is unnecessary to consider other
assignments of error directed to the instructions
given to the jury at the time of its recall.''
In Kelsey Y. United States, 47 F. 2<1 453, the court
said:
''Because of the imputations of stubborn or
worse which is likely to arise if the numerical division of the jury is publicly revealed, to require
disclosure of it is held error per se in the courts of
the United States, Brasfield Y. U. s., 272 rs 448,
71 L. Ed 345.''
Although the court while speaking may not have been
aware of it, the jury and counsel ·while listening felt that
the court was actually participating in the factual deliberations of the jury and the court's attempt to expedite those deliberations must haYe had some roereiYc
influence upon the sixth juror Yd1o ultimately joined the
other five in signing his name to interrogatory X o. 3. He
had witnessed, as had \H', the jurors who had signed the
questions while in the jtu~T-hox in open court so that it
was apparent to him, as it was to us, which jurors were
not concurring in that most important deliberation at that
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point. This, in effect, was not only a numerical disclosure
of how the jurors stood, but it was an identification of
tho~l' who had not yet concurred. It is also reasonable
to assume that the jurors who had indicated concurrence
with the special interrogatories by raising their hands
in open ('Ourt, as well as by signing the special verdict,
would feel reluctant to change their mind or their vote,
whereas otherwise in the deliberations which followed
they might have found it desirable or proper to do so.
"' e suppose that this is one of the fundamental reasons
that juries a.re instructed not to prematurely make up
their minds before their deliberations in the jury room
are concluded.
The jurors who had signed their names to the questions on the special verdict during their interrupted deliberations in the courtroom may very well have believed
that it would not be permissible or proper for them to
scratch out their names on the verdict form or in any
manner change their position, that having once formally
indicated their position they were precluded from amending or changing it. It would seem rather contradictory
for the court to take pains in admonishing the jury to
withhold their judgment until final submission of the
matter to them and then during their deliberations place
them in a situation where their expression of judgment
is prematurely requested. Certainly the jurors who had
already indicated how they stood in open court would
not want the judge or the parties to think that they would
vacillate or change their position, and this would render
further deliberations nugatory and unproductive as far
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as the modification of their expressed viewpoint was
concerned.
An examination of the special verdict discloses that
there was no change in the alignment of the jury and that
the signatures placed on the special verdict in open court
prior to the completion of the jury's deliberations were
not disturbed or altered and this, despite the fact that
the jury deliberated for approximately two hours after
their return from dinner. Thus plaintiff's fear of judicial
coercion eventuated into fulfillment.
The court, himself, had examined the partial verdict
and noted the names of the five who had signed it and
this very examination had occurred in the presence of the
whole jury. This is a much stronger factual situation
for a new trial than the federal cases just cited where
only the numerical division of the jury was the matter
about which inquiry had been made.
This coercive impact is evident from the statement of
the juror Lewis who did not like the atmosphere which
had been created and who felt that they should not try
to rush their deliberations with the view to getting home
and who stated that he felt, in fairness to both parties,
the matter should be decided on a level of not rushing and
taking the time, and the foreman, Mr. Oakson, said that
he thought the jury ought to go to eat and come back.
Of course, the court acquiesced in this desire expressed
by the jury, but the harm had already been done.
l\ioreover, it is always the policy of the court to encourage and favor the matter of settlement. N otwith-
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standing the affidavit of the attorney for the defendant,
there had be('n settlement discussion during the jury's
deliberations in which counsel for the defendant had
stated that he only had $3,500.00 authority and counsel
for the plaintiff had indicated a willingness to accept
$6,000.00. The premature disclosure of the jury's deliberations completely destroyed any settlement possibility, in that it was apparent to both parties that five
of the jurors had indicated an answer resolving the issue
in favor of the defendant because the court had made it
('lear in his comment that having answered the first three
questions, it was unnecessary for them to consider question No. 4 which was the question regarding damages.
We do not think that it is part of the function of the
trial judge to participate in the deliberations of the jury
after the matter has been submitted to them under a thorough and proper charge, and we earnestly submit that
the effect of the proceedings after the recall of the jury
was to create an improper interference with the jury's
function to the prejudice of the plaintiff, for which a
new trial should have been granted.
In the recent case of State of Utah v. Martinez, 7 U.
2d, 387, 326, Pac. 2d 102, :Mr. Justice Henriod in reversing the trial court for permitting jurors to ask questions
of a witness after they had retired to deliberate, took
note of the fact that counsel are placed in an embarrassing position where they are reluctant to invoke the displeasure of the jury by making objections under such circumstances. After the juror Pearce had made a re-
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quest for the reading of the testimony of the witness
Coburn at the time the jury was recalled, it may have
prejudiced the plaintiff's position to object to the juror's
request or to request the cross-examination to be read
after the juror had indicated he was satisfied with what
had been read. The court was in a much better position
to explain to the juror why his initial request should be
denied, and having erred in granting it, the trial court
could have made some effort to have the court reporter
read other evidence to the jury, and at least the crossexamination of the witness Coburn. The court was given
a further opportunity to correct or minimize the impact
of his error when the plaintiff moved for a mistrial, calling his attention to the failure to read the cross-examination of the witness and other evidence which substantially modified or opposed the direct testimony which had
been read.
POINT 2.
The cou,rt erred to the prejudice of the plaintiff
in. directin.g the court reporter to read part of
the direct testimon.y of the witness Coburn.

The court allowed the reading of part of the testimony of the witness Timothy W. Coburn at the request
of one of the jurors and although the court cautioned that
by reading it it was not intended that extra emphasis be
given to his testimony, that was nevertheless the inescapable result. His testimony related to the very problem that the jury was encountering in answering interrogatory No. 3 which at that point had not been resolved
hy a sufficient number of jurors to establish a verdict.
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The reading of a portion of the tP~timony of one witness
to the jury aftt.•r the matter had been submitted to them
was held reversible error in the Utah case of Jeuki,ns Y.
Sftphe11s, fi-t. ll. 307, 231 Pac. 112, from which we quote
as follows:
'' ... ~lr. Skeen was an important witness, testifying in rebuttal after the defendant had closed
her case. It was, therefore, doubly important that
if this witness' testimony was to be selected and
read separate from all other testimony bearing
on that particular question, his entire testimony
should have been read to the jury, notwithstanding the jury expressed themselves as satisfied
with what had been read.
"The Court of Appeals of Colorado in Hersey v. Tully, 8 Colo. App. 110, 44 Pac. 855, in considering the action of the trial court in permitting
certain testimony to be read to the jury after the
case had been submitted said: 'But without regard to any question of legal effect of this testimony, it was serious error to permit it to be read
to the jury after the case had been submitted to
them. They thus heard a portion of the plaintiff's
testimony twice and the last time disconnected
from all the other evidence, so that they went back
to their room with their memories refreshed as
to this; and having listened to it out of its connection, they would be liable to give it an importance
to which it was not entitled and which they would
not have given it otherwise.'
''Courts generally do not favor permitting any
one witness' testimony on a particular question,
whether there is other testimony on the record
bearing on the same question, to be read to the
jury after a case has been submitted....
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''We need not determine whether the giving
of the instruction and the reading of the testimony in the absence of counsel would of itself constitute reversible error in the absence of some
showing that prejudice resulted by permitting or
causing to be read to the jury the direct testimony
of a witness without having the cross examination
read, and in giving of an instruction which is in
conflict with former instructions, are such error
that in our opinion must of necessity result in a
reversal of the judgment and a granting of a new
trial.''
The above case was cited with approval in Justice
Wolfe's concurring opinion in Stale v. Peterson, 110 U.
413, 174 Pac. 2d 843.
On the cross-examination the witness Coburn qualified his direct testimony which alone was read to the jury,
by admitting that there were areas around the produce
counter where :Mrs. Cornia fell that needed to be spot
mopped; that after he had swept the floor down some
twenty to thirty minutes earlier he intended to return
with the mop and clean those areas up; that there had
been previous things on the floor that the cart had made
marks in, intermingled dirt and moisture and possibly
from other produce that had fallen or things of that nature. ( R. 224) Further on cross-examination Co burn testified that the produce manager freshened the vegetables
on that day prior to four o'clock.
In further conflict with the portion of the witness
Coburn's testimony which was read to the jury in which
he asserted that the plaintiff had apparently slipped upon
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n rherry, was the testimo11y of the plaintiff who testified
that the slippery substance upon which she fell was a
slimy sort of substance which she took to be either part
of a tomato or some grapes or something of that type
whirh had been intermingled with grime and dirt. (R.
H9) The witness Rigby stated that the problem on the
floor where plaintiff fell did not appear to be just due to
a single item of a cherry or a piece of tomato. (R. 189)
He also stated that the slimy dirty condition of the store
\ras not confined to the point where the plaintiff fell.
That he could not identify the type of vegetable or fruit
involved because of the dirt which was intermingled with
it. (R. 190) The witness Sartori had testified that he had
been in the aisle in question several times during the
course of the day, .(R. 216) and that there were areas
around the produce department that needed to be spot
mopped. (R. 218)
The witness Andreason testified that regardless of
the numerous trips he had made through the store on inspection, he did not request any spot mopping or brooming prior to closing time and he acknowledged that there
were several areas in the store that needed spot mopping
when he told ~Ir. Coburn to do it and he did not know at
what time of day they first needed to be spot mopped.
(R. ~35)

It was apparent during the postsubmission procedure in which the court directed, guided and participated
in the jury's deliberations, that question No. 3 was the
one which presented the most difficult problem to the jury
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- the matter upon which they ·were then, despite tlH'
court's interference, unable to agree. This emphasizes
the prejudicial impact of the court's reading a portion of
the witness Coburn's testimony in which he claimed to
have swept the store just twenty minutes prior to plaintiff's fall and that the plaintiff had apparently slipped
upon a cherry which had subsequently been dropped on
the floor in some unknown manner. Certainly it is fair
to say that the jury having listened to such testimony out
of its connection with the case and sans its subsequent
modification by the witness himself would be likely to
give to it an importance to which it was not entitled and
which would not have been given it otherwise.
This probability was directly called to the trial
court's attention by counsel for the plaintiff '"ho excepted
to the court's failure to read the cross-examination on
the ground that the portion read placed undue emphasis
upon that part of the witness's testimony, and it placed
undue emphasis upon a vital portion of the evidence about
which there was no other evidence elicited from other
witnesses.
POINT 3.

The trial court erred in denying plaintiff's motion, for mistrial and in denying plaiutiff subsequent motion for a new trial.
For the reason set forth in the argument under
Points 1 and 2, plaintiff was deprived of a fair trial, and
the court erred in denying plaintiff's motion for a mistrial and for a new trial.
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CONCLUSION
For the various reasons discussed in this brief, and
for any other reasons which may occur to this court
through careful consideration of this appeal, plaintiff
.. ariiPstly contends that the judgment of the lower court
should be reversed and plaintiff, in the furtherance of
justice, should be granted a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,

WOODROW D. WHITE
Attorney for
Pla.intiff-Appellant

25
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

